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The politics of health-care reform in the
Netherlands since 2006
HANS MAARSE* AND AGGIE PAULUS
Faculty of Health, Medicine and Life Sciences, Department of Health Organisation, Policy and Economics,
University of Maastricht, The Netherlands
Abstract : This article comments on Schut and van de Ven’s overview of the
results of purchaser competition in Dutch health care, which concludes that
the glass can be seen as half full or half empty. Although it is true that results
have been achieved, we believe that the evidence is incomplete and in some
respects flimsy. More importantly, however, Schut and van de Ven neglect the
political context of the market reform introduced in 2006. The reform is far
from finished and there has been a constant need for political compromise.
Optimism about the market’s potential also seems to be on the wane. Several
insurer and provider initiatives have provoked political resistance. As a result,
there are good reasons to argue that the reform’s future is uncertain.
Introduction
Dutch health-care reform, in particular health insurance reform, has attracted
wide international attention. Yet it is important to note that the integration
of the former sickness fund scheme and private health insurance arrangements
into a single mandatory national scheme with competition between insurers and
freedom of choice for consumers (van de Ven and Schut, 2008) is only the first
step in the reform process. One may even argue that the new health insurance
scheme does not make up the essence of the reform. The real test is whether
the reform makes health-care delivery more efficient, innovative and patient-
oriented without compromising the so-called public interests of solidarity, uni-
versal access, affordability and quality of care. Health insurance reform plays
only an instrumental role in this respect – a point that tends to be overlooked by
international observers. Competition in health insurance does not make much
sense, if it is not accompanied by competition in purchasing and health-care
delivery.
*Correspondence to: Hans Maarse, Faculty of Health, Medicine and Life Sciences, Department of Health
Organisation, Policy and Economics, University of Maastricht, PO Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht,
The Netherlands. Email: h.maarse@maastrichtuniversity.nl
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Schut and van de Ven (2011) address an important issue in their overview of
the effects so far of purchaser competition. They take as their leading question
‘whether and how insurers are taking up their role as purchasers of health
services’. This question relates to a fundamental assumption underpinning
the Dutch reform – namely, that health insurers will play a key role in the
restructuring of health care. Spurred by competition, they will act as prudent
purchasers. In doing so – the theory goes – health-care providers will be forced
to perform better in terms of efficiency, innovation, quality of care and patient-
orientation. High-performing providers will be rewarded with contracts, while
poor performers may lose contracts.
What can we conclude from Schut and van de Ven’s concise but interesting
overview of the evidence of purchaser competition? Is the glass half full or
half empty? They do not give a definitive answer to this question. Instead, they
argue that the answer depends on one’s perspective: given the evidence available,
the glass may be seen as half full (the optimist’s view) or as half empty (the
pessimist’s view).
Our comments address three topics. First, we briefly analyse the institutional
and market context of purchaser competition. This analysis is followed by a
short reconsideration of the evidence presented by Schut and van de Ven.
Although it is true that results have been achieved, we believe that the evidence
is incomplete and in some respects flimsy. Second, Schut and van de Ven neglect
the politics of health-care reform after 2006. Building a political majority for the
new health insurance act in 2005 was quite a performance, but the road to
further reform is paved with political obstacles. In fact, the government still
needs to take several market-making decisions, which means the eventual shape
of the reform is uncertain. For our third topic, we briefly discuss a few cases
of what is termed the real world of the market reform to illustrate its still
controversial nature. To conclude, we find that there is more reason to be pes-
simistic than optimistic about the impact of the market reform.
Reconsidering the evidence
Schut and van de Ven give a helpful overview of what purchaser competition has
achieved so far – no easy task due to the lack of good evidence. The available
evidence is patchy, to a large extent based on qualitative data and, in most
respects, more anecdotal than systematic. However, the general impression is
that insurers have mainly focused on prices and much less on the quality of care.
There are several explanations for this.
First, for a long period there were hardly any systematic, comparable data on
the quality of hospital services. The situation has improved somewhat, but to
take a big leap forward requires much more information on quality, as Schut
and van de Ven rightly point out. Second, in 2006 neither insurers nor hospitals
had much experience of negotiating on price or quality. The third factor is
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market structure. The room for purchaser competition is quite different in a
market with many competitors from a market with only one provider. Extensive
collective bargaining is still the norm in the Netherlands. For example, for
services in the price-regulated segment of hospital care (segment A), the leading
insurer in a region determines contracts with a hospital and the other insurers
simply conform to this contract. An implication of this collective model is that
the market leader cannot negotiate any exclusive advantage – so an agreement
on waiting times applies to all other insurers. Hospitals adhere to the principle
of equal treatment and are reluctant to give an insurer an exclusive contract
based on quality for fear it may damage their reputation. Finally, purchaser
competition assumes patient steering, but this is controversial for many patients,
whose prevailing perception is that insurers are driven more by money than
quality. Insurers therefore have a credibility problem (Boonen, 2009), an
important reason why they have largely abstained from selective contracting so
far. Once again, they fear reputation damage.
Schut and van de Ven present some data to substantiate their claims, paying
attention to the effects of purchaser competition on hospital prices. The data
indicate that price increases in the free-pricing segment of hospital care (segment
B) are lower than in segment A (see their Table 3). However, there are reasons to
be careful in drawing firm conclusions here. The method used to calculate price
increases in segment A differs from the method used in segment B. Calculations
are based on factor prices in the former and on DTC1 prices in the latter.
Another problem is comparability. To what extent are the medical services in
segment B comparable to the medical services in segment A? New, often very
expensive, medical interventions are likely to concentrate in segment A. And one
may wonder to what extent price increases in segment B really match the market
advocates’ expectations. Are they satisfied with the results?
A further issue is volume. Do hospitals offset lower prices in segment B by an
increase in the number of services? Schut and van de Ven present a single figure
to argue that a volume increase did not incur in segment B. We believe this
evidence is too flimsy to substantiate their claim. Moreover, the claim is coun-
terintuitive, since Schut and van de Ven also argue that waiting times have
fallen. As there is no reason to assume a decline in demand for care, shorter
waiting times can only have been achieved by an increase in volume.
In addition, we do not know whether the volume of services produced by the
so-called independent treatment centres (ITCs) is included in the analysis. ITCs
are small-scale specialised organisations mainly providing high-volume routine
care to patients in fields such as ophthalmology, dermatology, maternity care,
orthopaedic surgery, cosmetic surgery, radiology and cardiology. The number of
1 Diagnosis Treatment Combinations (DTCs) are used for case mix-based funding of hospitals and
are comparable to diagnosis-related groups. DTCs exist for inpatient and outpatient hospital care (see
Maarse and Normand, 2009 for further details).
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ITCs has risen substantially from 30 in 2000 to about 180 in 2009 (Maarse and
Normand, 2009). There are indications that the cost overruns in 2009 were
partly due to a sharp increase in the volume of health services produced by ITCs
(Financieel Dagblad, 14 April 2010).
There are other indications of a volume effect, which Schut and van de Ven do
not discuss. For example, the data in Table 1 demonstrate a dramatic increase in
the general practitioner (GP) care costs per insured since 2006. It is likely that
this increase is to a great extent caused by the new fee-for-service elements in
the GP payment system introduced in 2006. Whereas the number of patient
consultations per GP practice per year in 2006 was assumed to be 8296, it
turned to be 9439 (CVZ, 2009). There is no evidence that the cost increases in
GP care were offset by a decrease in the costs of hospital care per insured (the
so-called substitution effect). In physiotherapy the sharp decline seen in 2004
was the result of a substantial cut in the amount of physiotherapy included in
the benefits package of the sickness fund scheme. From 2005 physiotherapy
prices have been open to negotiation. Since then, the costs per insured have risen
steadily, but because the price of physiotherapy services stabilised after 2006,
the cost increase may be attributed to a volume effect (CVZ, 2009).
Another reason for some scepticism about the effects of the market reform
concerns the increase in premiums for both basic (statutory) and complementary
(voluntary) health insurance. The community-rated premium for basic coverage
(corrected for the shift from a no-claims bonus to a mandatory deductible in
2008)2 grew by 8.8% in 2007 and by 5.2% in 2008 (Vektis, 2009). The income-
related contribution rate increased from 6.5% of income in 2006 and 2007 to
7.2% in 2008. Premiums for complementary coverage grew by 8.6% in 2007
and 8.3% in 2008. In our view, this premium growth does not point to great
success – and bear in mind that insurers made a loss on basic health insurance
(see Schut and van de Ven (2011) for further details).
Table 1. Cost increase per insured 2003–2008 (h)
2003* 2004* 2005* 2006** 2007** 2008**
General Practitioner care 103 102 102 119 124 127
Physiotherapy 48 20 22 21 24 27
*Only sickness fund insured.
**All insured.
Source: CVZ (2009).
2 The new health insurance scheme originally included a no-claims bonus – in essence a pre-paid co-
payment of h255 in addition to the community-rated health insurance premium. The money was
refunded to the subscriber in proportion to the costs of their medical consumption (excluding GP care,
maternity care and care for children aged under 18). The arrangement was abolished in 2008 due to its
very limited effect on medical consumption, and replaced with a mandatory deductible of h155.
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In summary, in considering whether the glass is half full or half empty, we
tend to think it is more empty than filled. In the following sections, we will
substantiate our view further by analysing the politics of the market reform from
2006 onwards.
The politics of market making
Implementation of the market reform in health insurance fundamentally differs
from implementation of the market reform in purchasing and health-care
delivery. For health insurance, the government followed a ‘big bang’ strategy.
When the new health insurance legislation came into force the sickness fund
scheme and all substitutive private health insurance plans ceased to exist and
were replaced with the new scheme. The only precautionary measure to avoid
market disruption was the adoption of a safety net that put a limit on an
insurer’s maximum gain or loss per subscriber. Intended to be a temporary
measure to ease the transition, the net – part of the ex-post risk equalisation
scheme – is still in place today, although the government has said it will phase it
out from 2011.
In contrast, in implementing market reform of purchasing and health-care
delivery the government has pursued a step-wise strategy. For example, in 2005
segment B hospital procedures accounted for only 10% of total hospital
expenditure (in reality it was even less), rising to about 20% in 2008 and about
34% in 2009. A political decision about a further increase to 50% is pending.
The incremental approach has been adopted in other areas such as pharmacy,
midwife and orthodontic care. The government’s central planning regime for
hospital care was only abolished in 2008 (2009 for long-term care).
The main reason for this ‘cautious implementation strategy’ (as the govern-
ment terms it) lies in three interconnected factors: uncertainty, risk avoidance
and political controversy. Uncertainty relates to the outcomes of the market
reform. What will the consequences of competition be? Positively formulated,
one may speak here of the adoption of a learning model. There must be
empirical evidence to show that the market works as expected by its advocates
and that there are no adverse effects on the quality and accessibility of health
care. For this reason, the effects of the market reform are constantly monitored
and evaluated by the Netherlands Healthcare Authority (NZa), an arm’s length
agency in charge of market regulation and development.
Risk avoidance means avoiding disruption in health-care delivery at any price.
Health care is politically and socially too sensitive an area for risky policy
experiments and therefore requires an incremental implementation strategy.
Only if competition works can further steps be taken; if it does not work or
adverse effects occur, remedial policy measures will be necessary. However,
policy learning and risk avoidance cannot be seen as isolated from the politically
controversial nature of the market reform. Caution and incremental decision-making
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also arise due to the constant need to find a political compromise between
market advocates and opponents. For example, in the policy programme of the
government that took office in 2007, the coalition parties agreed that further
steps towards freely negotiable prices in hospital care could only be taken after a
careful evaluation (by the NZa) of the effects of previous steps on the quality
and accessibility of care.
Two other controversial policy issues illustrate how far the market reform is
from being finished. The first issue can be framed in terms of the tension
between freedom (market) and the need for control. On one hand, the gov-
ernment sees competition as an effective instrument to foster efficiency. In the
market model, total health-care expenditures are the ‘spontaneous’ product of
volume and prices. On the other hand, however, total health-care expenditures
should not exceed predetermined budget ceilings set by the government. In other
words, market competition must be combined with total (or macro) budget
control and the government needs an instrument to offset any overruns by
skimming provider revenues.
It is clear that this strategy of market competition with budget control forms a
political compromise between those who favour market competition and those
who are concerned about uncontrollable health-care expenditures (such as the
Ministry of Finance). In fact, the government’s policy proposal looks like
squaring the circle, as the Netherlands Hospital Association immediately noted.
The NZa acknowledged the need for effective cost control, but argued that
other and better instruments were available to keep expenditures within pre-
determined budget limits such as benchmarking, raising the mandatory deduc-
tible or reducing the benefits package of the new health insurance scheme. The
Minister of Health considered the last two instruments ‘the easy way’ and, for
that reason, politically unattractive. The new government will have to resolve
this issue and its decision will certainly be influenced by the political composi-
tion of the coalition.
This is also the case for another political issue. Traditionally, there has been a
ban on for-profit hospital care in the Netherlands. Hospitals must function as
non-profit entities. They are permitted to retain a budget surplus (just as they are
responsible for budget deficits), but are obliged to reinvest the surplus in pro-
viding care. When the market reform began, the government saw the lifting of
the ban as a ‘natural’ element of it. However, lifting the ban was not seen as a
priority and was postponed. The Netherlands Hospital Association is strongly in
favour of lifting the ban, the more so because hospitals are responsible for
financing capital investment (included in the price of each DTC) and increas-
ingly rely on external private investors (Maarse and Normand, 2009). Private
investors will only be interested if they can expect a return on investment and, as
(co-) owner, can influence strategic decision-making.
Since for-profit hospital care is still controversial, the government has had to
compromise. It has emphasised not wanting a commercial type of hospital.
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Private investors can be paid ‘a result-related compensation for risk capital’, but
they do not have the status of co-owner and are not permitted to have a dominant
influence on the hospital’s management either. They are only given the right to
appoint a single member of the hospital’s supervisory board. Nor can they sell their
profit certificate without the supervisory board’s approval. It does not come as a
surprise that this proposal was heavily criticised by the hospital association and
private investors. The comment of the latter was short: the compromise will not
work. The CEO of a big pension fund (seen as an important potential investor)
stated that pension funds could not be expected to function as the health system’s
‘cash dispenser’. How the issue will be settled remains unclear.
The list of examples could easily be extended. The message, however, is clear.
The market reforms are far from finished, decisions need to be taken and
decision-making is surrounded by political controversy. A significant develop-
ment is that the Labour Party has expressed doubts as to whether the market
reform should be continued (Bos, 2010). The Vice-President of the Highest
Advisory Council has also recently criticised the ‘market state’ (Raad van State,
2010). As a result of these issues, the future shape of the market reform is
uncertain – nobody really knows how it will eventually look. A cautious
approach to avoid disruption has its advantages, but also comes at a price: the
risk of half-way implementation due to results lagging behind expectations,
unexpected difficulties, increasing costs, a changing political environment and so
on. Of course, advocates of the market reform hold a different view. They argue
that a fault confessed is half redressed.
Market reform in the real world
Our discussion of the market reform has so far concentrated on political deci-
sion-making at government level. In this section we turn our attention to politics
at the local level. We briefly discuss three cases, each of which attracted sig-
nificant political attention at the national level, including the involvement of the
Minister of Health. The cases shed light on the real world of the market reform.
The first case concerns the IJsselmeer Ziekenhuizen (IJsselmeer Hospitals). In
2008, the IJZ was close to bankruptcy. It had lost a lot of market share to
neighbouring hospitals. The quality of its care did not meet all standards and the
hospital had been paralysed by many years of internal conflicts following a
merger in the early 1990s. Market advocates always stipulate that, as a matter
of fact, competition will inevitably result in provider bankruptcies. But did the
IJZ go bankrupt? After a period of intensive consultation and negotiation the
NZa eventually decided to give the hospital financial support. A private entre-
preneur, now the chairman of the hospital’s executive board, also invested in the
hospital. The Minister of Health was heavily involved in the decision-making
process. He took the position that he did not feel responsible for the continuity
of an individual hospital, but could only be held accountable for the continuity
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of hospital care in the region where a hospital in financial trouble was located.
Following the report of an external advisor (Lodewick, 2008), he concluded that
continuity and accessibility were seriously at risk in this case, declaring the
hospital to be ‘a system hospital’ vital to the region.
The IJZ case contains several lessons. Creative destruction through bank-
ruptcy appears to be uncommon where hospitals are concerned. The criterion
of continuity is more abstract than concrete, leaving decision-makers with
considerable policy discretion. Decision-making takes place in a complex
political-administrative environment involving a myriad of actors with mutual
dependencies. Insurers also face a quandary. Following the logic of selective
contracting, they would have had good reason not to contract the IJZ or only in
a selective way due to its non-competitive prices and the failing quality of some
of its hospital services. But selective contracting would have influenced regional
accessibility to hospital care and would certainly have caused negative publicity.
Furthermore, the new health insurance act obliges insurers to purchase care of
sufficiently high quality for their subscribers. So insurers continued to contract
the hospital and the ex-post risk equalisation arrangement enable them to shift
the extra costs to the equalisation fund. A further issue was whether financial
support to the hospital was in accordance with European Union competition
law, which only allows for state support under strict conditions (RVZ, 2009).
IJZ is not an isolated case. In the last few years, there have been several
bankruptcies, particularly in home care, but most of them concerned small
organisations whose services and personnel could easily be taken over by others.
One large home care provider (Meavita) also went bankrupt due to serious
mismanagement. Again, the Minister of Health was heavily involved, again
closely orchestrating financial support. At present various hospitals are finan-
cially at risk or even technically bankrupt. It remains to be seen what will
happen with these hospitals and how the Minister of Health will respond.
The second case also concerns a hospital in financial trouble. In 2009, local
actors decided to invest in and take over the Vlietland Hospital (VH) to tackle
its problems. Among the actors in the consortium were medical specialists,
general practitioners, long-term care providers and the dominant regional
insurer, which would acquire 40% of the consortium’s shares. The insurer’s
substantial stake made the takeover resemble a form of vertical integration,
which had been forbidden prior to the 2006 reform, but is now permitted. Since
the ban on vertical integration was lifted several insurers have become involved
in financing provider organisations. However, this particular instance was
heavily resisted in parliament and the Minister of Health was asked to forbid the
integration on the grounds that it would severely restrict freedom of choice –
one of the objectives of the reform – for the insurer’s subscribers. Every party in
the consortium would have a financial interest in referring patients to the VH.
Vlietland’s experience reveals several things. First, it shows how the reform
objective of choice for subscribers seemed to conflict with another strategic
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goal – that insurers and providers should be responsible for addressing their own
problems and ensuring access to health care. Second, it shows how controversial the
reform is: even politicians who support it do not always accept its consequences.
Third, it raises the question of whether the consortium would have genuinely
restricted the choice of the local population. Not only is the hospital in an area with
several other hospitals nearby (Baarsma et al., 2009), but if it had gone bankrupt
this would have given patients one option less. Finally, it is worth noting that the
local population was in fact very interested in keeping its own hospital open.
The third case concerns an initiative of the Kennemer Gasthuis (KG) to
enhance patients’ freedom. KG gave its patients the option of being treated
faster for extra payment, legitimising its initiative by stating that the extra
revenues would be reinvested in hospital care so that eventually everybody
would benefit from the arrangement (the so-called Robin Hood model). How-
ever, media reports led to a social and political outcry. The hospital’s initiative
was perceived as a violation of the principle of equal access and, as in the
previous case, the Minister of Health was asked to put an end to the experiment.
It eventually turned out that the initiative was not in accordance with health-
care legislation, but in the first instance it was disqualified as an example of two-
tier care and queue jumping, reflecting the prevailing egalitarian culture in
Dutch health care.
KG’s case is not an isolated one (Putters, 2001). Several providers now offer
their clients extras for additional payment. Single hospital rooms, which have
largely disappeared over the last three decades, are emerging once more. As market
competition leads to a more differentiated supply system, which may conflict with
the principle of equal access, it has ignited a debate about whether it is possible and
legitimate to draw a line between basic health services (where the principle of
universal and equal access applies) and additional health services.
Conclusion
Schut and van de Ven present an interesting overview of the results of purchaser
competition in Dutch health care. They conclude that it depends on one’s per-
spective whether one considers the glass to be half full or half empty. We believe
they are too optimistic and neglect the political context of the market reform,
which is far from complete and requires constant political compromise. Opti-
mism about the market’s potential seems to be on the wane and there are good
reasons to argue that the reform’s future is uncertain. Schut and van de Ven
argue that ‘the effectiveness of purchaser competition crucially depends on the
success of the ongoing efforts to improve performance indicators, product
classification and the system of risk equalisation’. While these are important
policy issues, they suggest that further development of the market reform is
primarily a technical issue, a kind of intellectual puzzle. We have argued that
this view is fundamentally flawed.
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